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PANDEMICS AND PANDEMONIUM:
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION
OVER PUBLIC HEALTH
KERI GAMMON†

ABSTRACT
It has long been accepted that the provinces have general jurisdiction over
healthcare. But many aspects of public health – the branch concerned
with the welfare of populations – can be argued to lend themselves to
federal involvement. This was recently illustrated in 2003 when SARS,
a previously unknown disease, arrived in Toronto and wreaked havoc
on the local public health system. The epidemic highlighted numerous
shortcomings within Ontario’s system and caused us to question those
of the other provinces. Not surprisingly, the federal government quickly
came under heavy pressure to take leadership and action in respect of
public health. In response, we received the Public Health Agency of
Canada (PHAC). However, the agency’s full mandate is unclear at the
time of this paper, and as yet it is without an enabling statute.
This article is concerned with the extent, if any, of the
constitutional jurisdiction for federal involvement in public health. It will
use hypothetical federal legislation regarding infectious disease control
to evaluate the possible heads of power for such involvement: Peace,
Order and Good Government; Criminal Law; the Spending Power;
and Quarantine and Marine Hospitals. The author will then review
the long-held bases for provincial jurisdiction: Municipal Institutions;
Hospitals; Property and Civil Rights; and Matters of a Local or Private
Nature. Throughout the paper, the author makes reference to public
health’s constant struggle to balance individual rights with the welfare
of the larger community. The author observes that there is a great deal
of variation among the provinces in how they have chosen to balance
† Keri Gammon is a third year law student at Dalhousie Law School. She will be
clerking at the BC Court of Appeal in 2006 and will complete her articles with Fasken
Martineau DuMoulin in Vancouver. She would like to express great thanks to Professor Ronalda Murphy for her assistance with this paper and to Professor Elaine Gibson
for  ﬁrst  introducing  her  to  public  health  law.
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these interests, and suggests that this variation can be attributed to
the societal and cultural differences among the provinces. The author
concludes by asserting that when a subject matter not only implicates
provincial heads of power but plays heavily upon local values, there
is excellent reason to leave primary jurisdiction with the provinces in
all but extreme cases, despite the arguments which could be made for
federal jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in the Canadian Journal of Public Health, the claim is
made that:
[A] government’s fundamental role is to preserve the security of its
citizenry, and as such it must be structured in a way that ensures that
the health of its population is protected.1

But, in a federal state such as ours, which level of government is to act
for this purpose? If this fundamental role applies to both the provincial
and federal governments, what are the constitutional sources of power
that  grant  the  authority  needed  to  fulﬁl  that  role?  And  if  jurisdiction  is  
to be shared between these two levels of government, how should it be
assigned so as to respect federalism? Viewed through the lens of public
health, these questions are as increasingly relevant as they are evasive
of resolution.
Although a province’s receipt of federal funding for healthcare is
contingent upon its compliance with the federal Canada Health Act,2
provinces have retained wide discretion over the provision of healthcare  and  health  services.  The  provinces  enjoy  jurisdiction  over  health  
insurance programs,3 the regulation of health professionals,4 hospitals
and similar institutions,5 and the provision (and in some cases, enforcement) of treatment.6 The provincial legislative landscape includes mental health, the protection and management of health information, hospitals, nursing homes and other care facilities, and the focus of this article,
1

Kumanan Wilson, “The complexities of multi-level governance in public health” (2004)
95(6) Can. J. Public Health 409 at 409.
2

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [Canada Health Act].
Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 646, 151 D.L.R. (4th)
577 [Eldridge cited to S.C.R.].
4
See Linette McNamara, Erin Nelson & Brent Windwick, “Regulation of Health
Care  Professionals”  in  Jocelyn  Downie,  Timothy  Caulﬁeld  &  Colleen  M.  Flood,  eds.,  
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) at 55.
5
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No. 5 at s. 92(7) [Constitution Act].
6
See e.g. Schneider v. British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, 139 D.L.R. (3d) 417
[Schneider cited to S.C.R.]; Fawcett v. Ontario (A.G.), [1964] S.C.R. 625, 45 D.L.R.
(2d) 579 [Fawcett cited to S.C.R.].
3

4 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

public health. This discussion will centre on public health legislation
addressing the management and control of infectious disease which,
until now, has been left to the provinces and has never been seriously
questioned from a constitutional division of powers perspective.7
However, a shift may be underway. In March 2003, a previously
unknown respiratory illness appeared in Toronto and quickly began
to terrorize both the public and the public health system.8 The illness
was soon coined “SARS,” or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. The
months that followed saw 44 deaths and 438 probable and suspect cases
of the disease in Canada.9  Remarkably,  the  outbreak  remained  conﬁned  
within Ontario. However, the chaos it created within that province highlighted the larger, more systemic weaknesses of public health in Canada
generally. For example, Ontario’s experience brought to light problems
such as:
[A] lack of surge capacity in the clinical and public health systems;
difﬁculties   with   timely   access   to   laboratory   testing   and   results;;  
absence of protocols for data or information sharing among levels
of government; uncertainties about data ownership; inadequate
capacity for epidemiologic investigation of the outbreak; lack of
coordinated  business  processes  across  institutions  and  jurisdictions  
for outbreak management and emergency response; inadequacies
in institutional outbreak management protocols, infection control,
and infectious disease surveillance; and weak links between public
health and the personal health services system, including primary
care, institutions, and home care.10

As observed by the National Advisory Committee on SARS and
Public Health, it is likely that other provinces would have faced similar
7

Although there has been at least one Charter challenge to such legislation. See
Toronto  (City,  Medical  Ofﬁcer  of  Health)  v.  Deakin, [2002] O.J. No. 2777 (QL)
(challenging the detention and treatment provisions of Ontario’s Health Protection
and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-7).
8
See especially The National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health,
“Learning from SARS - Renewal of Public Health in Canada” (Ottawa: Health
Canada, October 2003) [Learning from SARS]; World Health Organization,
Communicable Disease Surveillance & Response (CSR), “Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS),” online: <http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en>.
9
Learning from SARS, ibid. at 20.
10
Ibid. at 1.
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issues had the outbreak not been contained.11 Had the epidemic spread,
these intra-provincial shortcomings would have been greatly compounded  by  numerous  inter-jurisdictional  problems.  These  problems  include  
uncertainty as to federal and provincial responsibilities during a health
crisis and the inadequate means of collaborative decision-making and
action among the provinces.12
In response to these problems, considerable pressure was placed
upon the federal government to create a national public health agency13
and  by  September  2004,  the  agency’s  Chief  Public  Health  Ofﬁcer  had  
been appointed.14 One year earlier at the Conference of Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FPT) Ministers of Health, the participants agreed
upon   the   necessity   of   inter-jurisdictional   collaboration   in   enhancing  
the national public health infrastructure, and thus began the blueprint
for the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network (PCPHN).15 Although the
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is currently without an enabling statute16 and the PCPHN is still in its early stages, it is clear that
the PCPHN was created to enable truly national consultation and engagement with regard to activities of the PHAC.17 However, the federal
11

Ibid. at 20.
Ibid. at 19.
13
See e.g. Learning from SARS, supra note 8; The Honourable Mr. Justice Archie
Campbell, “The SARS Commission Interim Report, SARS and Public Health in
Ontario” (April 15, 2004) [Campbell Commission, Interim Report].
14
Public Health Agency of Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada
Appoints  First  Chief  Public  Health  Ofﬁcer  to  Head  Public  Health  Agency  Of  
Canada” (24 September 2004), online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nrrp/2004/phac_nr_e.html>.
15
Health Canada, News Release, “Conference of Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Ministers of Health Halifax, Nova Scotia - September 4, 2003” (4 September 2003),
online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2003/2003_67_e.html>.
16
Bill C-75, An Act respecting the establishment of the Public Health Agency of
Canada and amending certain Acts,  1st  Sess.,  38th  Parl.,  2004-2005  received  its  ﬁrst  
reading on November 16, 2005 but the session ended before the bill completed the
legislative process.
17
     Health  Canada,  “Frequently  asked  questions:  Chief  Public  Health  Ofﬁcer  of  
Canada/Public Health Agency of Canada” (September 2004), online: <http://www.
hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2004/2004_47bk3_e.html>; Working Group on a
Public Health Agency for Canada, “Report: A Public Health Agency for Canada”
(2004), online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/phawg-aspgt-noseworthy/
index.html#toc>.
12
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status of the Agency raises the question as to Parliament’s constitutional
jurisdiction   over   public   health.  With   respect   to   the   agency’s   potential  
role in facilitating inter-provincial cooperation, the same question arises
and  the  boundaries  of  each  level  of  government’s  jurisdiction  must  be  
considered.
For the purposes of this discussion, a distinction is made between:
(a) public health activities concerned primarily with the prevention and
treatment of disease at the individual level, with a view to the welfare
of both individuals and the public at large; and (b) the regulation of certain activities and industries with a view to protecting the public from
broad-based harms such as radiation, environmental pollution, tobacco,
and  unsafe  food  and  drugs.  The  ﬁrst  of  these  is  addressed  almost  exclusively by provincial public health statutes, while the second has been
dealt with by both levels of government and, not surprisingly, has been
the  source  of  much  constitutional  litigation.  It  is  the  ﬁrst  conception  of  
public health with which this article is concerned.
In this article I will illustrate that the unique qualities of public
health demand a complex, and sometimes unusual, division of powers
analysis. Furthermore, I will argue that this uniqueness poses several
challenges to a traditional conception of federalism. Given that the driving force behind current federal efforts in public health is the issue of
infectious diseases,18 this topic will be my main focus. As such, I will
employ hypothetical federal legislation respecting disease management
and control. Following a comprehensive analysis of potential sources of
federal power to support such legislation, there will be a brief discussion
of  the  basis  for  the  virtually  unquestioned  provincial  jurisdiction  over  
matters  of  health.  The  article  concludes  with  the  ﬁnding  that,  notwithstanding   the   strong   constitutional   arguments   for   federal   jurisdiction,  
there are equally important yet unwritten principles that are only consistent with the provinces retaining primary responsibility over public
health and infectious disease control.
18

     The  term  “infectious  disease”  is  perhaps  best  deﬁned  by  way  of  example,  as  
it encompasses a wide variety of infections with little in common but for their
communicable nature. Illustrations of these diseases include tuberculosis, HIV,
smallpox and measles; sexually transmitted infections such as gonorrhoea and
chlamydia; and also more commonplace infections such as chickenpox and
inﬂuenza.  The  terms  “infectious”  and  “communicable”  will  be  used  interchangeably  
in this article, consistent with their use in provincial public health legislation.
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I. THE NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
HEALTH JURISDICTION
Whereas  constitutional  jurisdiction  over  health  has  been  the  theme  of  
considerable academic discourse19   and   judicial   comment,20 it was not
included  as  a  distinct  subject  matter  capable  of  federal  or  provincial  assignment in 1867. This is likely because health may have been assumed
to be a personal matter as between an individual and her doctor, attracting the responsibility of the provinces only in the event of an emergency
and otherwise leaving each municipality to address issues such as sanitation and disease control.21
19

See e.g. M. Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Health in Canada” (2000)
8 Health L.J. 95 [Jackman]; André Braën, “Discussion Paper No. 2: Health and the
Distribution of Powers in Canada” (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health
Care in Canada, July 2002) [Braën]; D. Gibson, “The Canada Health Act and the
Constitution” (1996) Health L.J. 1. Public health has received considerably less
attention; see e.g. “Chapter 9: Some Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by SARS and
Infectious Diseases in Canada”, in Learning from SARS, supra note 8; R.T. McKall,
“Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Public Health” (1976) 6 Man. L. J. 317.
20
See e.g. Eldridge, supra note 3 (provision of services); Schneider, supra note
6 (detention and treatment of heroin addicts); Fawcett, supra note 6 (mental health
legislation). As early as 1886, the division of powers with respect to health was
judicially  considered;;  interestingly  enough,  it  was  in  the  context  of  public  health:  
Rinfret v. Pope, [1886] 12 Q L.R. 303 (Que. CA).
21
Report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Dominion-Provincial  Relations, Book
II: Recommendations (Ottawa, E. Cloutier, Queen’s Printer, 1940) at 32-35
[Rowell-Sirois Report]. In explaining the relative inattention given to health in the
Constitution Act, 1867, the Commission wrote the following:
In 1867 the administration of public health was still in a very
primitive stage, the assumption being that health was a private
matter and state assistance to protect or improve the health of the
citizen was highly exceptional and tolerable only in emergencies
such as epidemics, or for purposes of ensuring elementary sanitation
in urban communities. Such public health activities as the state did
undertake were almost wholly a function of local and municipal
governments. It is not strange, therefore, that the British North
America   Act   does   not   expressly   allocate   jurisdiction   in   public  
health, except that marine hospitals and quarantine (presumably
ship quarantine) were assigned to the Dominion, while the province
was  given  jurisdiction  over  other  hospitals,  asylums,  charities  and  
eleemosynary  institutions.  But  the  province  was  assigned  jurisdiction  
over “generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in
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While it remains true that public health is addressed at the municipal
and provincial levels, the urbanization and economic interdependence
of modern Canada creates novel threats to health and brands of public
health emergencies of previously unimaginable scope. It is no longer
sufﬁcient  to  treat  public  health  as  if  it  were  capable  of  the  compartmentalization that applied in 1867. Not only do contemporary threats such
as   SARS,  West   Nile  Virus,   pandemic   ﬂu   (such   as   the  Avian   Flu)   and  
the spectre of bioterrorism suggest the desirability of a more national
approach to public health, in some instances federal action may be constitutionally required.
Upon  ﬁrst  inspection,  a  division  of  powers  analysis  of  public  health  
may present as purely academic. Indeed, if the recent proclamations22
of commitment to federal-provincial cooperation are any indication,
perhaps we are unlikely to see any government-initiated constitutional
challenges in this area. At this point, however, it is important to accurately   identify   the   constitutional   signiﬁcance   of   cooperation   between  
governments.  It  has  been  held,  for  example,  that  constitutional  jurisdiction cannot be obtained by a consensual transfer from one government
to another.23
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has also consistently alluded to the relevance and value of cooperation between the federal and
provincial governments. For example, in Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture)24 the federal
Attorney General intervened in support of the province, arguing that the
impugned provincial legislation was in fact intra vires. Writing for the
Court, LeBel J. held that:

the Province”, and it is probable that this power was deemed to
cover health matters, while the power over “municipal institutions”
provided a convenient means for dealing with such matters.
22
Health Canada, News Release, “Ministers of Health Announce Creation of the
Pan-Canadian Public Health Network and Name Council Membership” (22 April
2005), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2005/2005_26_e.html>;
Health Canada, News Release, “A 10-year plan to strengthen health care” (16
September 2004), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/
fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/index_e.html>.
23
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1950] 4 D.L.R.
369, [1951] S.C.R. 31 at 40.
24
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Kitkatla cited to S.C.R.].
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[W]hile this is not determinative of the issue…it does invite the Court
to  exercise  caution  before  it  ﬁnds  that  the  impugned  provisions  of  
the Act are ultra vires the province.25

Thus, a cooperative atmosphere between the federal and provincial governments  will  not  preclude  a  ﬁnding  that  one  has  subject  matter  jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other, but it will be one factor for consideration.
The above points are particularly important when we look to the
identities of potential constitutional litigants. Experience has shown
that it is more likely that a division of powers analysis will arise in the
context of a larger rights-based challenge to public health legislation
brought by an individual, rather than an inter-governmental challenge.
In such a case, inter-governmental cooperation is likely to be irrelevant
to the challenger, and the division of powers issue will inevitably be
before the court.
In so far as the PHAC may offer logistical support and additional
resources for provincial efforts, federal leadership in public health is
relatively unproblematic from a division of powers perspective. However, at present, the full scope of the Agency’s activities remains unarticulated and, possibly, undecided. Additionally, there is the federalisminspired risk that attempts to secure federal-provincial cooperation will
be unsuccessful, despite the work of the PCPHN.26 Such a failure might
provide an incentive for a more assertive – in other words, legislative
– approach by the federal government.
At this point in the discussion it becomes crucial to appreciate that
among   the   thirteen   provincial   and   territorial   jurisdictions   in   Canada,  
25

Ibid.  at  180.  This  practice  was  recently  conﬁrmed  in  Rothmans, Benson &
Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 411.
26
     While  cooperative  efforts  might  fail  where  one  or  more  jurisdictions  cannot  
agree, perhaps the more prominent concerns should be those of timeliness and
inaction. For example, the 1999 Auditor General’s report called for the creation of a
national public health surveillance network, to be led by Health Canada. Three years
later, the 2002 Report observed that limited progress had been made on most areas of
the  project,  including  the  creation  of  data-sharing  agreements  with  the  provinces.  See  
Auditor General of Canada, 1999 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter
14  —  National  Health  Surveillance:  Diseases  and  Injuries,”  online:  <http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9914ce.html>; Auditor General of Canada, 2002
Status Report, “Health Canada — National Health Surveillance,” online: <http://
www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20020902ce.html>.
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there exist vastly different approaches to numerous elements of public
health,27  and  to  a  certain  extent  these  variations  likely  reﬂect  important  
differences in history and culture between the provinces. Should Parliament’s  leadership  be  perceived  as  an  intrusion  into  provincial  jurisdiction, or in the event that a province is unwilling to yield on a particular
issue, public health may present a veritable constitutional battleground.
Furthermore, as stated above, it is always open for an individual litigant
to question the constitutionality of one government’s legislation in the
context of a larger action. Regardless of how the challenge arises, a
court will have to ascertain the constitutional validity of an impugned
law for compliance with the division of powers.
1. Public Health as a Subject Matter
Public health can be distinguished from health, generally, on the basis
of their respective ‘clients’. While health (or ‘medicine’) focuses on
individuals, public health is concerned with the communal well-being.
This  distinction  is  somewhat  superﬁcial  as  individual  health  has  obvious implications for the collective interest, and the collective well-being represents the aggregate health status of individuals. However, the
distinction   becomes   clearer   when   we   look   to   the   speciﬁc   example   of  
infectious disease. An infection begins at the level of the individual,
but the threat of widespread transmission requires that broader-based
measures be taken to prevent, manage and control that disease from
causing greater harm within the community. The inherently public nature of infectious disease certainly creates a strong incentive for federal
involvement; however, the corresponding provincial interest in respect
of individual health and protecting their own communities is both supported by logic and manifested in long-standing provincial public health
legislation and practice.
Each province currently employs a variety of public health practices
as set out in their respective statutes and as implemented by regional
27

See e.g. Elaine Gibson, “Provincial/Territorial Public Health and Emergency
Laws” (Presentation to Health Canada’s Public Health Workshop on Quarantine and
Legal Preparedness for Public Health Emergency, September 2004) [unpublished];
Jennifer L. Schulz, “Public Health Law” in Barney Sneiderman, John C. Irvine &
Philip H. Osborne, Canadian Medical Law: An Introduction for Physicians, Nurses
and other Health Care Professionals, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) [Schulz].
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health authorities.28 With respect to infectious disease, every province
requires its physicians to report to their public health authority any cases
of enumerated infectious diseases. In some provinces, this duty extends
to others such as school teachers, and still other provinces require reporting by any individual who suspects the presence of an infectious
disease in another person. Many provinces require that an infected individual’s  familial  and  sexual  contacts  be  notiﬁed  in  respect  of  certain  
diseases, while others leave reporting to the discretion of the physician
or are altogether silent on the matter. Once the presence of disease has
been  conﬁrmed,  the  imposition  of  treatment  will  depend  upon  the  province:  treatment  may  be  ordered  by  a  medical  health  ofﬁcer  acting  alone  
or as supported by a court order, or treatment may be at the election
of the individual provided that they take necessary precautions such as
isolation  to  minimize  the  risk  of  infecting  others.  Conﬁdentiality  provisions with respect to an individual’s health status may afford nearly
impermeable protections in some provinces while in others identifying
personal information can be released to the public where it is believed
necessary for the protection of the public.
This overview of public health activities is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide the reader with a sense of current provincial powers and practices. Additionally, it points to the existence of
gaps and inconsistencies as between the provinces in terms of how they
manage disease within their own boundaries. These differences, while
compatible with federalist principles,29 may attract the scrutiny of those
contemplating federal public health initiatives. As such, they will inform the hypothetical legislation and provide the starting point for a
division of powers analysis.

28

See generally Schulz, ibid., for the examples discussed here.
See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2005 Student Edition
(Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at ss. 52.9(d), 52.16 [Hogg]. As noted by Hogg, there is no
constitutional requirement for uniform legislation among the provinces. Differential
treatment that is only the result of legislative variation among the provinces will not
amount to a violation of equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter, as this
would run contrary to the very notion of federalism.
29
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2. The Hypothetical Legislation
This  discussion  will  employ  ﬁctitious  yet  plausible  federal  legislation  
respecting highly communicable diseases. It imagines that in anticipation of newly emerging (or re-emerging) infectious diseases, Parliament
has created a Public Health Protection Act. This umbrella legislation
authorizes the Minister of Health, using criteria enumerated in the statute, to identify those infectious diseases that pose a threat to the national
public health and to impose particular measures for their prevention and
control. The application of the Act would be limited to virulent diseases with the potential to spread widely, such as SARS or the diseases
addressed by the World Health Organization’s International Health
Regulations.30 It may also include less-threatening diseases appearing
in  unusual  clinical  forms  and/or  frequency,  such  as  a  pandemic  ﬂu  or  
a particular strain of infectious disease that has become resistant to all
available antibiotics.
Once a disease has been recognized by the Minister, the preventative and responsive measures would be quite broad and may include:
compulsory vaccination, mandatory reporting by the infected individual and others, obligatory testing for exposed individuals, the compulsion of personal health information as between the provinces and the
PHAC, quarantine and isolation provisions and mandatory treatment.
The PHAC, with the assistance of the PCPHN, would be responsible
for advising the Minister on the development of these criteria and response measures and additionally, would make recommendations for a
cooperative inter-governmental approach to infectious disease management.31  Finally,  the  use  of  penalties  including  ﬁnes  and,  in  some  cases,  
30

World Health Organization, “International Health Regulations (1969),” (Geneva:
World Health Organization, 2003) [IHRs]. These regulations apply to cholera, plague
and yellow fever. In May 2005, the World Health Organization approved a new set of
regulations intended to address a wider variety of international public health threats,
but they are not yet in force: see World Health Organization, News Release, “World
Health Assembly adopts new International Health Regulations” (23 May 2005),
online: <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr_wha03/en/index.
html>.
31
     In  these  respects,  the  ﬁctitious  Act would resemble the structure of the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33, and its creation of a National
Advisory Committee for the purpose of assisting the Minister of the Environment
in  making  regulations  with  respect  to  the  identiﬁcation,  control  and  management  of  
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imprisonment, would be available for the purposes of securing compliance with the Act.32

II. LOCATING FEDERAL PUBLIC HEALTH LEGISLATION WITHIN
THE DIVISION OF POWERS
This section will evaluate the following heads of power as possible
sources  of  jurisdiction  for  federal  public  health  legislation:  Peace,  Order  
and Good Government, the Criminal Law, the Spending Power, and the
authority over Quarantine and Marine Hospitals. While there are other
heads of power which may assist in supporting public health activities,
such as Trade and Commerce33 or the Treaty-Making power,34 neither
would provide an adequate basis for enacting a statute such as the Public Health Protection Act.
1. Peace, Order and Good Government
The residual power to legislate in relation to “peace, order and good
government” (hereinafter POGG) was given to Parliament by the preamble of s. 91 of the Constitution Act.35 Due to its residual nature, this
power is generally reserved for consideration until the more explicit
federal heads of power have been examined. However, it will be considered  ﬁrst  here  as  the  discussion  will  provide  a  better  foundation  from  
which to assess the other possible sources of power.
The   jurisprudence   recognizes   two   dimensions   of   POGG:   the   National Concern branch and the Emergency branch.36 Both will be discussed  brieﬂy  and  then  examined  in  the  context  of  public  health.
toxic substances.
32
This is consistent with provincial public health legislation, which generally
creates numerous offences and corresponding penalties. The frequency with
which these offences are prosecuted, however, is unknown and is likely worthy of
scepticism.
33
Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 91(2).
34
     As  conﬁrmed  in  Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication [1932] A.C.
304, 2 D.L.R. 81.
35
Constitution Act, supra note 5.
36
See especially R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 233 D.L.R.
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i. The National Concern Branch
In R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.,37  the  Supreme  Court  conﬁrmed  
the existence of the National Concern branch of POGG. The diverse
range of topics upheld under this branch includes aeronautics,38 the
creation of a national capital region,39 marine pollution,40 and atomic
energy.41
The Court in Crown Zellerbach provided the factors to be considered in applying the doctrine:
For a matter to qualify as a matter of National Concern in either
sense it must have a singleness, distinctiveness, and indivisibility
that distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a
scale   of   impact   on   provincial   jurisdiction   that   is   reconcilable  
with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the
Constitution.
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree
of singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matter of provincial concern it is relevant to
consider what would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a
provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or regulation of
the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.42

The scenario of an epidemic has been frequently invoked in the
POGG  jurisprudence  as  an  example  of  a  matter  concerning  the  nation  as  
a whole.43 Under the Emergency branch I will consider the prospect of
(4th) 415 at para. 69 [Malmo-Levine cited to S.C.R.]. Additionally, some case law
suggests a possible third dimension of POGG, referred to as the ‘gap’ branch by
Professor Hogg, supra note 29, s. 17.2. However, it will not be discussed here as it
has  not  been  expressly  recognized  by  the  jurisprudence  and  thus,  it  is  unlikely  that  
Parliament  would  rely  upon  it  as  the  source  of  its  jurisdiction  over  public  health.
37
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [Crown Zellerbach cited to S.C.R.].
38
Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, 4 D.L.R. 609.
39
Munro v. Canada (National Capital Commission), [1966] S.C.R. 663, 57 D.L.R.
(2d) 753.
40
Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37.
41
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 107
D.L.R. (4th) 457.
42
Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 432 [emphasis added].
43
See e.g. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 at 412, 2
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temporary legislation enacted for combating an existing emergency, but
under the National Concern branch the discussion need not be so constrained.  Consistent  with  the  principle  that  full  subject  matter  jurisdiction  will  be  granted  to  Parliament  where  the  matter  satisﬁes  the  Crown
Zellerbach factors,44 there is a case to be made that federal legislation
respecting infectious disease need not be limited to purely reactive
measures, but may also provide for the prevention of disease outbreaks.
Indeed, in Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada Temperance Federation the Privy
Council held that:
[T]o legislate for prevention appears to be on the same basis as
legislation for cure. A pestilence has been given as an example of a
subject  so  affecting,  or  which  might  so  affect,  the  whole  Dominion  
that   it   would   justify   legislation   by   the   Parliament   of   Canada   as   a  
mater concerning the order and good government of the Dominion.
It would seem to follow that if the Parliament could legislate when
there was an actual epidemic it could do so to prevent one occurring
and also to prevent it happening again.45

Thus, the case law alone provides a strong foundation for advancing
infectious disease control under the National Concern branch. At the
same time, it has never been seriously disputed that the provinces can
legislate in respect to public health, including the prevention and control
of disease. Indeed, the public health statutes of most provinces include
broad provisions for combating public health crises such as epidemics.46
But,  as  witnessed  during  the  SARS  outbreak  of  2003,  the  deﬁnition  of  
“epidemic” or “health emergency” may vary from one health authority
to  another,  just  as  the  assignment  of  such  a  designation  may  be  laden  
with local politics.47 Faced with the lack of distinction between public
D.L.R. 5; Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at 205,
207, 2 D.L.R. 1 [Canada Temperance]; Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 914 at 934, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 594.
44
Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 433.
45
Canada Temperance, supra note 43 at 207 [emphasis added].
46
See e.g. Saskatchewan’s Public Health Act, 1994, S.S. 1994, c. P-37.1, s. 45.
47
China was widely criticized for under-reporting the severity of the epidemic in
its early stages, both to its own citizens and to the international community. There
was speculation that the under-reporting was part of larger efforts to ensure political
and civil stability as the national legislatures opened for their next session. See e.g.
Time  Asia,  “How  Bad  Is  It?  Beijing  has  come  clean,  but  the  litmus  test  of  China’s  
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health practice and a public health emergency, where then might the
POGG power crystallize on the basis of National Concern?
Returning to the relevant factors in Crown Zellerbach,  the  jurisprudence makes it clear that neither health nor public health generally, will
be a matter capable of attaining such “singleness” or “distinctiveness”.
Indeed, in Schneider v. The Queen, Estey J.48 held that:
‘[H]ealth’  is  not  a  matter  which  is  subject  to  speciﬁc  constitutional  
assignment but instead is an amorphous topic which can be
addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in
the circumstances of each case on the nature or scope of the health
problem in question.49

It follows that the National Concern doctrine will only be available,
if  at  all,  in  limited  circumstances  and  for  very  speciﬁc  public  health  purposes. However, even the oft-cited example of an epidemic may require
further  reﬁning  before  it  would  attract  such  its  application.  Whereas  it  is  
easy to imagine how an infectious disease could quickly become a matter of extra-provincial concern, the “distinctiveness” requirement and
its focus on striking an appropriate balance of powers may pose the real
challenge to federal legislation in this area.
Environmental pollution may provide a useful analogy to disease
control, and the case law on that topic offers guidance on the distinctiveness inquiry. In R. v. Hydro-Québec,50 several provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act were challenged as being ultra vires
the federal government. The sections in issue purported to regulate the
release of substances that could harm the environment or present a danger to human health. The four-member minority declined to uphold the
provisions under the criminal law power and moved on to the National
Concern test under POGG.51 On the issue of distinctiveness, Lamer and
new openness is Shanghai,” (28 April 2003) online: <http://www.time.com/time/
asia/covers/501030505/story.html>;;  Time  Asia,  “Beijing’s  SARS  Attack:  Doctor  and  
party  member  insists  there  are  many  more  cases  than  ofﬁcials  will  admit,”  (8  April  
2003) online: <http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,441615,00.html>.
48
     Concurring  with  the  majority.
49
Schneider, supra note 6 at 142.
50
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 32 [Hydro-Québec cited to S.C.R.].
51
     The  ﬁve-member  majority  upheld  the  Act  as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  criminal  law  
power and thus, declined to consider it under POGG.
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Iacobucci JJ.52 held the Act’s  deﬁnition  of  “toxic  substances”  to  be  “an  
all-encompassing  deﬁnition  with  no  clear  limits,”53 thus failing to meet
the distinctiveness requirement.
In Crown Zellerbach, the issue was the application of the Ocean
Dumping  Control  Act to marine pollution in intra-provincial marine waters. Upholding the Act  under  POGG,  the  four-member  majority  concluded that pollution of marine waters by the dumping of substances
was  sufﬁciently  distinct  from  other  forms  of  water  pollution.  One  of  the  
reasons  for  this  ﬁnding  was  the  difﬁculty  in  ascertaining  the  boundaries  
between intra-provincial and extra-provincial marine waters; it was argued  that  this  difﬁculty  “creates  an  unacceptable  degree  of  uncertainty  
for the application of regulatory and penal provisions.”54 The minority, however, held that marine pollution was incapable of the requisite
distinctiveness because environmental pollution in general is “all-pervasive”   and   furthermore,   because   of   the   difﬁculty   in   determining   the  
boundaries between marine and fresh water (to which the impugned
provisions did not apply).55
At this point it is important to make a distinction between the true
pith and substance of the legislation and the means selected for addressing   its   subject   matter.   It   is   the   subject   matter   that   must   be   “distinct,”  
not the means employed to address it. Thus, although the hypothetical
legislation may contemplate a vast array of disease-control measures,
the  distinctiveness  of  the  subject  matter  itself  will  not  suffer  as  a  consequence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the pith and substance of the legislation cannot be challenged on the basis that there are
alternative, more effective means of achieving that purpose.56 Thus, the
wisdom of Parliament will not be questioned when it comes to the methods it chooses for the management and control of infectious disease.
On the other hand, the legal effect of the legislation may assist
in illustrating its pith and substance, and thus, may be relevant to the
distinctiveness inquiry. As held by McLachlin C.J. in Ward v. Canada
(Attorney General):
52

     Sopinka  and  Major  JJ.  concurring.
Hydro-Québec, supra note 50 at 260.
54
Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 437.
55
Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 455, 457.
56
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 569, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 42 at 582 [Ward cited to S.C.R.].
53
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The legal effect refers to how the law will affect rights and
liabilities, and is also helpful in illuminating the core meaning of the
law[…]. The effects can also reveal whether a law is “colourable”,
i.e. does the law in form appear to address something within the
legislature’s  jurisdiction,  but  in  substance  deal  with  a  matter  outside  
that  jurisdiction?57

There can be no doubt that federal public health legislation will affect legal rights that are usually reserved for regulation by the provinces.
For example, more stringent reporting requirements imposed upon physicians  and  other  health  care  providers  will  impact  the  conﬁdential  nature of the patient-provider relationship. Quarantine and isolation provisions may affect the legal relationship as between employers and their
employees  who  are  subjected  to  orders  under  such  provisions.  However  
the Supreme Court has held that:
‘[I]mpact’   with   nothing   more   is   clearly   not   enough   to   ﬁnd   that  
a   statute   encroaches   upon   the   jurisdiction   of   the   other   level   of  
government.58

Therefore, short of an allegation that the federal law is colourable in
such a way that it attempts to regulate a provincial matter, the intra-provincial effects will not compromise the validity of the federal law.
The reasoning in the pollution cases illustrates the distinction between pith and substance and legislative means. In Crown Zellerbach,
for   example,   the   disagreement   between   the   majority   and   the   dissent  
arose  over  whether  marine  pollution  was  a  sufﬁciently  distinct  subject  
matter. The fact that regulation of marine pollution under the Ocean
Dumping  Control  Act would involve the regulation of provincial activity such as construction and municipal activity did not compromise the
distinctiveness of the issue; it simply provided an incentive for the appellant corporation to challenge the Act. In Hydro-Québec, the minority
was troubled by the impugned legislation’s broad conception of “toxic
substances”  as  a  subject  matter;;  their  analysis  was  not  concerned  with  
the proposed means of regulating those substances, regardless of how
far-reaching those means might have been. Thus, the expansive gamut
57

Ibid. at 579.
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 567, 83
D.L.R. (4th) 297 [CAP Reference cited to S.C.R.].

58
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of measures that might be taken in respect of preventing or controlling a
speciﬁc  disease  does  not  compromise  the  distinctiveness  of  the  subject  
matter. The distinctiveness must be found in the matter to be prevented
or controlled.
Generally speaking, “communicable disease” captures a vast range
of infections from chickenpox to smallpox, from salmonella poisoning
to  tuberculosis,  from  gonorrhoea  to  HIV.  In  other  words,  the  deﬁnition  
of “communicable disease” may suffer from the same absence of ascertainable outer limits as did “toxic substances” in the view of the dissenting  judges  in  Hydro-Québec. Accordingly, there is a strong case for
making federal public health legislation such as the hypothetical PHPA
applicable  only  to  speciﬁc  diseases  or  circumstances  (such  as  an  unusually sizeable outbreak of an otherwise less worrisome disease) and
furthermore, for providing clear and meaningful criteria for determining
which diseases or circumstances will trigger its application.
In assessing the distinctiveness of infectious disease:
[I]t is relevant to consider what would be the effect on extraprovincial interests of a provincial failure to deal effectively with the
control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.59

Often referred to as the “provincial inability test,” this factor tells us that
the  mere  desirability  of  uniform  legislation  will  not  sufﬁce,  despite  the  
national  importance  of  the  subject  matter.  The  relevant  concern  is  not  a  
question of legislative capacity or the adequacy of provincial resources,
but whether the intra-provincial efforts of one province in this regard
would be compromised by the legislative choices or inaction on the part
of  another.  The  provincial  inability  test  will  only  be  satisﬁed  if  the  failure  by  one  province  to  adequately  deal  with  the  subject  matter  would  
lead to harm for the other provinces that had taken steps to address the
matter.
Those  cases  that  have  satisﬁed  the  test  to  date  centred  on  issues  such  
as aeronautics, atomic energy and marine pollution. Given the nature of
these  subject  matters,  little  serious  discussion  of  the  provincial  inability  
test was required. As a result, relatively little guidance exists as to the
lower threshold of provincial inability.

59

Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 432.
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Hogg, however, suggests that an epidemic is likely to satisfy the
test. He observes that:
[T]he failure of one province to take preventative measures would
probably lead to the spreading of disease into those provinces which
had taken preventative measures.60

Such a claim has immediate appeal, even if we have seen examples
to the contrary. For example, during the SARS crisis of 2003, other
provinces were relatively fortunate in that the outbreak remained localized to Ontario. Under such strain, the shortcomings of its public
health system were brought to light and severely criticized.61 Considering these shortcomings, the fact that the epidemic did not spread beyond
the provincial borders was perhaps due largely to luck, for the simple
fact remains: pathogens, like pollution, do not respect borders. Should
one province fail to adequately address infectious disease control within
in  own  population,  the  movement  of  cross-border  trafﬁc  and  even  goods  
could quickly transport the disease to other regions which had previously avoided such an outbreak by adopting strict preventative measures.
The National Concern doctrine also requires “that the scale of federal intrusion upon provincial authority must be reconcilable with the
constitutional division of powers.”62  This  principle  qualiﬁes  the  broad  
label of “National Concern” and assists in setting the parameters of a
federal regime. The above analysis suggests that legislation such as the
hypothetical PHPA would be supportable under this branch, but there
are several qualities of public health which make the division of powers
reconciliation  difﬁcult.  First,  since  Confederation  public  health  has  been  
dealt with almost exclusively by the provinces and, in that time, comprehensive legislation and authoritative bodies have been established in
each  jurisdiction.  Federal  initiatives  will  likely  have  to  rely  upon  the  existing public health infrastructure of each province for their successful
execution.  Secondly,  the  difﬁculty  in  separating  everyday  public  health  
practice from federal activities with nation-wide importance poses practical problems in determining when the respective boundaries are being
overstepped. Finally, where public health practice is most successful at
60
61
62

Hogg, supra note 29 at ss. 17.3(b).
See especially Campbell Commission, Interim Report, supra note 13.
Crown Zellerbach, supra note 37 at 432.
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preventing and controlling disease, it is arguably very private in nature,
and inextricably linked to the provincially-regulated practitioner-patient
relationship, health insurance and hospitals. Assuming for the sake of
argument that federal legislation could satisfy the other requirements
under the National Concern branch, the real challenge may arise in minimizing  its  impact  upon  the  long-standing  provincial  jurisdiction  over  
public health.
Finally, it is important to remember even without an attempt by Parliament to legislate in this area, a challenge to existing provincial public
health  laws  may  result  in  a  ﬁnding  that  the  subject  matter  is  truly  an  inter-provincial concern and thus, within the exclusive legislative purview
of Parliament. For example, in Inter-provincial Co-op Ltd v. Manitoba63
the  majority  held  that  the  provincial  legislation  that  attempted  to  control  
and remedy intra-provincial harm resulting from extra-provincial pollution was ultra vires. Although the federal government was not a party
to the case, the Court declared that Parliament had exclusive authority
over  the  subject  matter  under  their  residual  power.  
ii. The Emergency Branch
Rendered   a   near-ﬁction   by   earlier   decisions   of   the   Privy   Council,64
POGG’s Emergency branch of was revitalized by the Supreme Court in
the Anti-Inﬂation  Reference.65 The reasoning of the Supreme Court in
this case illustrates the difference between this branch and the National
Concern branch. In Anti-Inﬂation, despite the fact that the all-pervasive
nature  of  ‘inﬂation’  would  not  likely  meet  the  distinctiveness  requirement under National Concern, the statute was upheld as valid emergency  legislation  by  seven  of  the  nine  judges,  as  reﬂected  in  two  separate  
judgments.66

63

[1976] 1 S.C.R. 477, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321 [Inter-provincial Co-op cited to S.C.R.].
Save for during times of war and the immediate post-war periods, the Privy
Council was unwilling to uphold federal legislation under this branch. For a
discussion on this point, see Hogg, supra note 29 at 17.4(a)-(b).
65
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 [Anti-Inﬂation  Reference cited to
S.C.R.].
66
Laskin C.J. writing for Judson, Spence and Dickson JJ and Ritchie J. writing for
Martland and Pigeon JJ.
64
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Both  sets  of  reasons  afﬁrm  that  the  term  “emergency”  in  this  sense  
need not be limited to times of war, but the legislation must be temporary in nature. It was made clear that courts should not inquire into the
actual existence of an emergency but, in a more deferential approach,
should  focus  on  whether  Parliament  had  a  rational  basis  for  ﬁnding  that  
an emergency existed.67 Further, Parliament will not have the onus of
establishing the rational basis; rather, the responsibility will be on the
party challenging the legislation to prove its absence.68
The issue that split the Court is illustrative of the breadth afforded to
the  deﬁnition  of  “emergency”  in  this  judgment.  Despite  the  considerable  
expert evidence advanced to discount the existence of an economic crisis and the relative paucity of supporting or rebuttal evidence advanced
by the federal government, the Court did not split on the “rational basis”
consideration. This may very well mark the height of deference afforded
to Parliament by the Court. Rather, the dissenting reasons concern Parliament’s failure to make an explicit declaration that it was legislating
under its residual emergency powers. On this issue, Beetz J. wrote:
Parliament cannot enter the normally forbidden area of provincial
jurisdiction  unless  it  gives  an  unmistakable  signal  that  it  is  acting  
pursuant to its extraordinary power. Such a signal is not conclusive
to support the legitimacy of the action of Parliament but its absence
is fatal.69

The   reasoning   of   the   majority   in   Anti-Inﬂation and the Court’s
strong deference to Parliament suggest that a federal law enacted for the
sole purpose of combating an epidemic would be intra vires Parliament.
However,  given  the  hesitation  of  the  dissenting  judges  in  the  same  case,  
Parliament would be wise to explicitly invoke the Emergency power as
the  basis  for  subject  matter  jurisdiction.70 However, it must be remem67

Anti-Inﬂation  Reference, supra note 65 at 425.
Martland and Pigeon JJ. concurring. The reasons of Laskin C.J. are more elusive
on this point, although they have since been interpreted to place the same onus on the
challenging party.
69
Anti-Inﬂation  Reference, supra note 65 at 463.
70
     The  political  ramiﬁcations  of  making  such  a  declaration  are  outside  the  scope  of  
this discussion, but it is recognized that there may be hesitation on the part of elected
ofﬁcials  to  employ  such  potentially  panic-inducing  terminology  such  as  “public  
health emergency”.
68
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bered  that  such  a  ﬁnding  amounts  to  only  a  temporary  suspension  of  the  
division  of  powers.  If  the  subject  matter  of  disease  control  is  otherwise  
within  provincial  jurisdiction,  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  epidemic  such  
jurisdiction  will  revert  back  to  the  provinces.  Thus,  for  sources  of  federal  jurisdiction  on  an  ongoing  basis,  the  National  Concern  branch  is  the  
more attractive option under POGG.
However, given that the courts have been cautious in their application of the National Concern branch, as well as the deference shown to
Parliament in Anti-Inﬂation  with  respect  to  the  ﬁnding  of  a  bona  ﬁde
emergency, Parliament may be wise to make use of this branch. This
route would be particularly attractive should Parliament wish to have
only temporary management of disease control. For example, contemporary concerns such as SARS or Avian Flu may lend themselves to
federal  jurisdiction  so  long  as  they  remain  relatively  new  threats.  The  
necessarily temporary nature of Emergency legislation requires that
Parliament   re-visit   the   subject   matter   at   a   later   date   and,   if   continued  
jurisdiction  is  desirable  at  that  time,  requires  that  a  factual  foundation  
be provided to support permanent legislation.
2. Criminal Law Power
In RJR-MacDonald  Inc.  v.  Canada  (A.G.)71 the Supreme Court reviewed
the federal criminal law power and its application in the health context.
The requirements were succinctly produced by La Forest J.72 after declining  to  consider  POGG  as  the  jurisdictional  basis  for  the  impugned  
Tobacco Products Control Act:
[T]he scope of the federal power to create criminal legislation
with respect to health matters is broad, and is circumscribed only
by the requirements that the legislation must contain a prohibition
accompanied by a penal sanction and must be directed at a legitimate
public health evil.73

These requirements - a legitimate public purpose, and one or more prohibitions supported by a penalty - will be discussed below.
71

[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [RJR-MacDonald cited to S.C.R.].
     Writing  for  the  majority  on  the  division  of  powers  issue.
73
  RJR-MacDonald, supra note 71 at 246.
72
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Short work can be made of establishing a valid public purpose behind legislation aimed at the control of infectious diseases. It has been
held that “[p]ublic peace, order, security, health, morality: these are the
ordinary though not exclusive ends served by that law,”74 and disease
control could easily be argued as serving several of these purposes and
infectious diseases surely amount to a public health evil.
The reasoning in Schneider75 is illustrative of the difference between
a health-related purpose and a public health purpose. In that case, British Columbia sought to uphold provincial legislation providing for the
detention and treatment of heroin addicts. In challenging the law’s validity, the Appellant argued that such measures were in pith and substance criminal law, and thus were ultra vires the province. Although
the statute was ultimately upheld as a valid exercise of provincial power
pursuant to s. 92(16), the case can be distinguished on the basis that the
law was directed towards the rehabilitation of the individual rather than
the protection of the community at large. The societal dangers of heroin
addiction are quite different than the threats posed by infectious disease.
As measures taken in respect of such diseases are aimed at safeguarding
the welfare of the greater community, laws that call for such measures
are likely to have the requisite public purpose to be upheld as valid
criminal law.
The next requirement from RJR-McDonald is that the law must create one or more prohibitions directed towards the public purpose, in
this case, control of an infectious disease. For examples of prohibitions
that might be included in our hypothetical legislation, we can look to
existing provincial public health statutes, where prohibitions include:
the failure by a health professional to report to the local public health
authority  in  respect  of  a  notiﬁable  disease,  the  failure  by  an  individual  
to follow isolation or quarantine orders, and more generally, the failure
by an individual to comply with the precautionary measures ordered
by  a  public  health  ofﬁcial,  such  as  notiﬁcation  of  family  members  and  
contacts of one’s infectious status.76
The third requirement of a valid criminal law is that a penalty must
attach  to  any  prohibitions.  The  imposition  of  a  ﬁne  or  prison  term  for  
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Reference  re:  Dairy  Industry  Act  (Canada)  s.  5(a), [1949] S.C.R. 1 at 50, 1 D.L.R.
433, aff’d [1951] A.C. 179.
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Schneider, supra note 6.
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See generally Schulz, supra note 27.
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non-compliance is typical of both criminal law and existing provincial
public health legislation.77 However, Parliament could hardly criminalize the mere status of having an infectious disease, and short of deliberate transmission or the failure to comply with preventative measures
ordered   by   public   health   ofﬁcials,   it   would   present   an   administrative  
nightmare78 to criminalize the spreading of disease from one individual
to another. Instead, public health laws often seek to prohibit and/or enforce conduct that appears to be ancillary to disease control, such as the
required  reporting  of  notiﬁable  diseases  by  health  care  professionals  to  
the local public health authority for surveillance purposes. It was held
in RJR-McDonald that such an approach – the criminalizing of ancillary
activity without criminalizing the underlying activity itself – does not
necessarily compromise the criminal nature of the law.79 Given this reasoning, Parliament would have wide latitude in selecting the measures
to be used in combating and managing infectious disease.
Where a federal law that claims to be criminal in nature has the effect of creating a regulatory scheme allowing for exemptions and the
exercise of administrative discretion, that law may face a constitutional
challenge on the basis that it does not create a true prohibition and thus,
is not a valid criminal law.80 This becomes important when drafting federal public health legislation, in that existing provincial public health
statutes include numerous exemptions and often authorize the exercise
of  discretion  by  public  health  ofﬁcials  in  enforcing  the  statutory  provisions. For example, Manitoba’s Public Health Act allows individuals
with an infectious disease to be exempted from a treatment order where
77

Although it is unclear as to how often, if at all, the penalties are imposed for the
purpose of enforcing provincial public health efforts. In fact, many of the penalty
provisions  appear  to  be  outdated,  providing  in  some  cases  for  very  limited  ﬁnes  in  
consequence of some of the more serious offences under these acts. For example,
s. 34 of Newfoundland’s Communicable  Diseases  Act (R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-26)
provides that:
[A]  person  wilfully  committing  a  breach  of  this  Act  shall  be  subject  
to a penalty not exceeding $100, or in default of payment, to
imprisonment  for  a  period  not  exceeding  30  days,  or  to  both  a  ﬁne  
and imprisonment.
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Not to mention ripe grounds for a Charter challenge.
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RJR-MacDonald, supra note 71 at 258.
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See e.g. Reference re: Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 185 D.L.R.
(4th) 577 [Firearms Reference cited to S.C.R.]; Hydro-Québec, supra note 50.
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they oppose such treatment on religious grounds.81 Under the Ontario
Health Protection and Promotion Act, physicians have broad discretion in the types of directives they provide to patients suffering from
an infectious disease, and non-compliance with those directives constitutes an offence under the Act.82 Similar exemptions and discretion may
be included in federal public health legislation, and it may very well
resemble a regulatory scheme. However, if the primary raison d’être
behind  federal  jurisdiction  in  this  area  is  the  highly  virulent  nature  of  
particular diseases and the need for a common, standardized approach
to their control, one would expect that such exemptions and discretion
would be more circumscribed than in general provincial public health
legislation.
In any event, federal legislation in this area is bound to be complex
and is likely to appear regulatory in nature. The reasons in the Firearms
Reference provide guidance as to drafting criminal law of this sort. In
that case, the Court held that “[t]he fact that the [Firearms] Act is complex does not necessarily detract from its criminal nature.”83 Despite the
allowance   for   administrative   discretion   in   the   registration   of   ﬁrearms  
and the licensing of their users, the Court found that the discretion was
not  overly  broad,  and  it  was  sufﬁciently  informed  by  the  Act. Indeed,
even if a statute gives full discretion to the responsible Minister, that is
not necessarily enough to take the statute out of the criminal domain.84
3. The Spending Power
Although not an explicit head of power under s. 91, the federal spending power in s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 198285 affords Parliament the
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C.C.S.M., c. P210 at s. 32.
R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7 at ss. 22, 100.
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Firearms Reference, supra note 80 at 805-806.
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Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Constitution Act,
1982]. Section 36 provides:
36(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their
legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of
Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering
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opportunity  to  inﬂuence  many  provincial  activities.  Through  the  use  of  
conditional grants, Parliament can provide incentives to the provinces
to exercise their constitutional powers in accordance with federally-determined standards. The Canada Health Act operates in this manner,
providing for transfer payments to the provinces on the condition that
their  provincial  health  insurance  programs  comply  with  the  ﬁve  criteria  
outlined in the Act.86
The Canada Health Act and several other acts were challenged in
Winterhaven Stables v. Canada under the claim that they were statutes
in relation to exclusively provincial matters and thus, were ultra vires
Parliament. The Alberta Court of Appeal adopted the reasons of the trial
judge  in  holding  that:
Parliament…is entitled to spend the money that it raises through
proper exercise of its taxing power in the manner that it chooses to
authorize. It can impose conditions on such disposition so long as
the conditions do not amount in fact to a regulation or control of a
matter outside federal authority.87

Although the sheer size of the grant or the province’s palpable need for
the funds may appear to blur the line between incentive and coercion,
the case law suggests that the courts will not look behind the legislation to question whether the province had a real choice as to whether to
accept a conditional grant.88 Provided that the grant is not a colourable
attempt by Parliament to regulate a matter falling exclusively within
provincial   jurisdiction,   the   courts   will   not   interfere.   For   example,   in  
Winterhaven, the Court held that the purpose of the impugned statutes
was “the allocation of federal funds to assist the provinces in providing

economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of
making  equalization  payments  to  ensure  that  provincial  governments  have  sufﬁcient  
revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably
comparable levels of taxation.
86
Canada Health Act, supra note 2 at s. 7. The criteria laid out in s. 7 include:
public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and accessibility.
87
(1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 413 (Alta. C.A.) at 434 [Winterhaven].
88
See e.g. Winterhaven, supra note 87; CAP Reference, supra note 58.
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services”89 and found that this was consistent with the history of costshared programmes as expressly contemplated in section 36.
A recent article by discusses the federal spending power as a means
of implementing national public health standards as designed by PHAC
at the provincial level.90 Indeed, s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982 appears to support federal spending with respect to public health. What
remains unclear is whether or not the federal government can impose
conditions  upon  such  a  grant  absent  explicit  constitutional  jurisdiction  
with  respect  to  public  health.  While  the  jurisprudence  does  not  openly  
contemplate any such requirement before the creation of a conditional
grant,  such  a  requirement  may  be  understood  from  the  qualiﬁcation  that  
the conditions “do not amount in fact to a regulation or control of a matter outside federal authority.”91 However, more likely is the case that
this   qualiﬁer   functions   to   provide   a   limit   on   the   degree   of   federal   involvement,  rather  demanding  federal  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter involved.
The value of invoking the spending power to achieve national disease-control standards is also its weakness. By affording the provinces a
choice as to whether to accept a conditional grant from the PHAC, their
jurisdiction  over  basic  health  matters  is  respected.  They  can  choose  not  
to adopt the federal condition and instead employ their own legislation.
The possibility that one or more provinces would choose that option
would provide considerable incentive for federal-provincial collaboration in creating the conditions in an effort to achieve the buy-in of the
provinces. However, if one province should refuse to agree to the conditions, the value of the national scheme is compromised.92 This could be
89

Winterhaven, supra note 87 at 433.
Kumanan Wilson, “A Canadian Agency for Public Health: Could it Work?”
(2004) 170(2) Canadian Medical Association Journal 222. The article does not
discuss what these standards would look like, but for the purposes of this article
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     As  discussed  above  under  POGG,  speciﬁcally  the  National  Concern  branch’s  
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a very real danger with respect to conditions around mandatory treatment given that some provinces take a very libertarian approach to such
issues.93 Furthermore, as the provincial public health infrastructure is
long-standing and well-established, the availability of additional federal  funding  for  public  health  may  not  be  sufﬁciently  compelling  to  the  
provinces such that they will acquiesce to the attached conditions if they
oppose them. Federal funding may prove more attractive with respect
to  costly  novel  programs  which  exist  in  few,  if  any,  jurisdictions.  However, if the purpose of the funding is to supplement existing provincial
programs while securing compliance with newly drafted federal standards, the persuasive value of that funding may be considerably less,
particularly when it comes to the larger provinces. For these reasons,
the importance of the federal spending power is limited with respect to
enacting national public health standards.
4. Quarantine and Marine Hospitals
As  mentioned  above,  Parliament  has  jurisdiction  over  “Quarantine  and  
Marine Hospitals.”94 This power is manifested in the Quarantine Act,95
which provides for the detection and management of certain infectious
diseases at international points of entry and departure. While the health
powers under the Act extend to the reporting of personal health information, health assessment of individuals, disease testing, quarantine, isolation and treatment, the reference in s. 91(11) to marine hospitals appears
to  limit  its  application  to  international  border  trafﬁc  (with  the  primary  
focus on incoming travellers), rather than recognizing a generally approvincial inability test.
93
For example, under the Quebec Public Health Act (R.S.Q., c. S-2.2) the only
disease for which treatment can be mandated is tuberculosis (although individuals
suffering from other diseases may be required to remain in isolation). By contrast,
Saskatchewan’s Public Health Act, 1994, (S.S. 1994, c. P-37.1) allows a medical
health  ofﬁcer  to  order  the  treatment  of  an  individual  where  the  ofﬁcer  considers  it  
necessary to decrease or eliminate the health risk presented by an infectious disease.
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Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 91(11).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. Q-1. This legislation will be replaced by Bill C-12, An Act to
prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases, 1st Sess., 38th Parl.
(assented to on May 12, 2005) once the accompanying quarantine regulations have
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plicable federal public health power. Furthermore, the quarantine power
is perhaps a necessary but limited corollary of Parliament’s immigration
power96 and the resulting authority over national borders. Thus, despite
the fact that the federal quarantine power is the only explicit constitutional reference to public health, its presence in s. 91 provides little
assistance  in  the  broader  discussion  of  public  health  and  its  proper  jurisdictional assignment.

II. PUBLIC HEALTH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN UNDER
PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION
In Schneider, Dickson J.97 held that:
[T]his   view   that   the   general   jurisdiction   over   health   matters   is  
provincial  (allowing  for  a  limited  federal  jurisdiction  either  ancillary  
to the express heads of power in s. 91 or the emergency power under
peace, order and good government) has prevailed and is now not
seriously questioned.98

As the primary focus of this article has been to examine the counter-arguments of this view with respect to public health, it is now necessary to
examine its foundational underpinnings. However, the provincial heads
of power, particularly those with which we are concerned here, have
not received the same type of analytical treatment by the courts as we
have seen for the federal heads of power. For example, there is neither
a ‘test’ nor prescribed indicia for determining whether a matter is one
of a “local and private nature,” under s. 92(16). Similarly, “property
and civil rights”99 simply encompass easily recognizable matters such
as tort law, contracts and the regulation of professional relationships.
Thus, in responding to the federal arguments above, the discussion focuses  on  the  conceptual  rather  than  legal  arguments  for  provincial  jurisdiction over the control of infectious disease. Municipal Institutions
will  be  considered  ﬁrst,  in  light  of  their  historical  role  in  public  health  
leadership.  Consistent  with  the  jurisprudence,  Hospitals,  Property  and  
96
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Constitution Act, supra note 5 at s. 91(25).
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Civil Rights and Matters of a Local or Private Nature will be addressed
together.
1. Municipal Institutions
The provinces were given authority to legislate in relation to “Municipal Institutions in the Province” by s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act and,
since prior to Confederation, municipalities have taken responsibility
for numerous public health matters.100 Indeed, even today municipal
public health authorities are the ‘front line’ for combating epidemics
and other public health threats. While s. 92(8) does not provide a foundation upon which the provinces can legislate directly with respect to
public  health,  the  argument  for  provincial  jurisdiction  over  such  matters  
is  supported  by  the  long-standing  role  of  municipalities  as  the  ﬁrst  line  
of public health defence, and the constitutional relationship between the
municipalities and their province.
The constitutional authority for such municipal and thus, provincial,  responsibility  was  conﬁrmed  in  several  early  cases.  For  example,  
municipal by-laws directed at infectious disease control were upheld
as   valid   exercises   of   provincial   jurisdiction.101 In a slightly different
approach, an earlier case found that the inherent responsibility of municipalities with respect to public health activities gave the provinces
jurisdiction  over  public  health  by  way  of  s.  92(8).102 In a more recent
case, a municipal by-law prohibiting close-contact dancing in adult entertainment parlours was upheld as a valid exercise of municipal and
provincial authority to legislation in relation to public health.103 In that
case, the city of Toronto claimed its by-law was directed towards the
health risks posed by close-contact dancing to both exotic dancers and
patrons. The applicant challenged the law on the grounds that it sought
100
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to regulate morality and was thus criminal law, and ultra vires the municipality. The Ontario Provincial Court held that any element of morality was merely ancillary to the broader purposes of protecting health
and preventing crime in licensed entertainment establishments, both of
which  were  held  to  be  valid  municipal  and  provincial  objectives.
The principles in these cases are consistent with the basic logic regarding the role of the local community in managing threats to its citizens. A municipality is the best positioned to know its residents, identify
risks as they arise, and respond in the manner best-suited to that community’s unique needs and culture. Furthermore, people are likely to
rely  ﬁrst  and  foremost  on  their  closest  level  of  government  to  protect  
them from such risks.
2. Hospitals, Property and Civil Rights, Matters of a Local or
Private Nature
Taken together, these three sections are thought to give the provinces
primary  jurisdiction  over  health  and  public  health.104 As alluded to in
the Introduction, these provisions have been held to ground a nearly
exclusive provincial power to legislate in relation to health and health
care. However, for public health purposes, the former two provisions
are   arguably   less   pertinent   than   is   the   jurisdiction   over   local   and   private matters. The power to legislate in relation to “the establishment,
maintenance and management of hospitals, charities and eleemosynary
institutions in and for the province”105 relates primarily to issues such
as funding and other administrative matters related to the governance
of hospitals and similar institutions.106 This power is also thought to
include  subjects  such  as  patient  rights  and  treatment  standards,107 both
of which are relevant to public health practice. However, the broader
community-based concerns of infectious disease control can be argued
to  transport  the  subject  away  from  the  hospital  power  and  ground  it  in  
s. 92(16), with patient rights and treatment standards being corollary
to   the   subject   matter.   Likewise,   while   the   regulation   of   relationships  
104
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between health professionals and their patients, and provincial health
insurance schemes, both of which fall under s. 92(13), are implicated
in the public health system, property and civil rights does not ground
general provincial efforts aimed at infectious disease management.
In a discussion paper prepared for the Commission on the Future of
Health Care in Canada, André Braën suggests that “health itself can be
seen on the whole as a strictly local matter”108 and thus, granted to the
provinces under s. 92(16). This proposition is supported by the case law.
For  example,  the  majority  in  Schneider relied upon that section to uphold provincial legislation providing for the detention and treatment of
heroin addicts. In R. v. Morgentaler109 the  Supreme  Court  conﬁrmed  that  
view, holding that “[s]ection 92(16) also gives [the provinces] general
jurisdiction  over  health  matters  within  the  province.”110
Despite the generous provincial allowance under that section, in
Morgentaler the Court found Nova Scotia’s provisions restricting abortion services to be criminal law in pith and substance. Review of extrinsic evidence such as the transcripts of legislative debates revealed that
the legislation was directed at preventing the “perceived public harm or
evil” of private abortion clinics.111 In delineating the difference between
the  criminal  law  power  and  provincial  jurisdiction  over  health,  Sopinka  
J. wrote:
[I]f the central concern of the present legislation were medical
treatment of unwanted pregnancies and the safety and security of the
pregnant woman, not the restriction of abortion services with a view
to safeguarding the public interest or interdicting a public harm, the
legislation would arguably be valid health law enacted pursuant to
the  province’s  general  health  jurisdiction.112

This reasoning might be viewed as supporting the criminal law
power for legislating with respect to communicable disease control. To
be sure, public health is concerned with reducing public harm, and the
measures taken with respect to individuals may be seen as ancillary to
108
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that broader public purpose. However, the “public interest” and “public
harm”  referred  to  by  Sopinka  J.  in  that  case  reﬂected  the  deeply  moral  
nature of the abortion debate. Infectious disease, on the other hand, does
not generally include an element of morality. The public interest in controlling disease is not only much clearer and less controversial in infectious disease, but the public interest of safeguarding the community
could  be  argued  to  ﬁt  squarely  within  the  provincial  concerns  under  s.  
92(16).
In Schneider, the Court found British Columbia’s Heroin Treatment
Act  to  be  within  the  jurisdiction  conferred  by  s.  92(16).  For  Dickson  J.,  
it   was   an   important   ﬁnding   that   heroin   addiction   had   not   reached   the  
level of national concern, and furthermore, he found that the failure by
one province to provide adequate treatment programs would not result
in harm to the other provinces.113   Instead,   in   adopting   the   ﬁndings   of  
an earlier report he held that “narcotic addiction is […] a physiological
condition necessitating both medical and social intervention. This intervention is necessarily provincial.”114
With respect to infectious disease control, the potential for extra-provincial  harm  is  very  real.  Thus,  the  dialogue  of  a  jurisdictional  dispute  is  
likely to amount to “national concern” versus “local and private matter.”
However,  the  provinces  have  the  beneﬁt  of  strong  conceptual  arguments  
under s. 92(16). The communicable nature of a disease should not be
permitted to obscure the fact that the disease still exists at the level of
the individual, and that it is combated in part by medical intervention
on an individual basis. While in public health law the concern for the
individual is frequently subordinated to the concern for community welfare, such subordination in constitutional law should be less tolerable,
and  even  suspect.  To  deny  legislative  jurisdiction  from  the  province  because  an  individual  is  being  treated  or  quarantined  for  the  beneﬁt  of  the  
community would undermine our conception of dignity and would further disenfranchise the individual from their community. It would also
deny the reality of our health care system; individuals are treated by our
health system as ends in themselves, even where certain measures taken
in respect of an individual will serve a utilitarian purpose. Despite the
measures imposed upon the infected individual, they are still afforded
113
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procedural protections and rights, and are provided with medical services  speciﬁc  to  their  needs.
An outbreak of disease may quickly escalate into more than a merely local matter. However, as discussed above, the management of an
outbreak is perhaps best addressed by the locality, whether in the early
stages  outbreak  or  during  a  widespread  epidemic.  The  fact  that  inter-jurisdictional cooperation is very desirable in such an emergency should
not detract from the reality that local public health units will be called
upon  to  provide  the  ﬁrst  line  of  defence,  even  if  they  are  asked  to  do  so  
in accordance with nationally-designed standards of practice.

4. THE IMPORTANCE OF A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO PUBLIC
HEALTH
The SARS crisis of 2003 provided a long overdue wake-up call. Although the Canadian experience was primarily localized within one
province,  jurisdictional  issues  arose  nonetheless.  For  example,  when  it  
came to personal health information, municipalities, the province of Ontario and Health Canada disagreed as to the obligations and constraints
upon each level of government when it came to sharing that information
with the others.
A robust public health system requires a concerted national effort.
But   national   effort   does   not   necessarily   mean   federal   jurisdiction;;   it  
requires cooperation and leadership. The federal government, through
PHAC and the PCPHN, can employ cooperative approaches in addressing the problems within the existing provincial public health framework. Some of these problems may result from differences among the
provincial approaches to public health, and others may be the result of
confusion  over  jurisdiction  (as  seen  with  the  SARS  example  in  the  context of information sharing).
When it comes to activities such as the reporting and sharing of
public health information (such as personal health information), federal
jurisdiction  may  be  required  by  the  National  Concern  branch  of  POGG  
to ensure that the PHAC can effectively identify threats, track the evolution of outbreaks, coordinate a national response, share meaningful data
with the international community and provide accurate and comprehensive surveillance data for conducting public health research. But when
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it comes to other public health activities – those related directly to prevention, control and management of communicable disease – inter-provincial  differences  in  approach  may  not  always  be  fatal  to  the  efﬁcacy  
of  larger  public  health  efforts.  More  signiﬁcantly,  these  differences  are  
illustrative of an important but unwritten constitutional principle – that
of democracy.
Notwithstanding  the  strong  arguments  for  federal  jurisdiction,  perhaps the best counter-argument is as follows. The ability of local government to identify and respond to the needs of its community is unmatched
by the federal government. This argument is particularly applicable to
public health practice where the interests, autonomy and liberty of the
individual must be reconciled with the collective interest of their local
community.  The  practical  beneﬁts  of  local  jurisdiction  in  the  American  
context have been noted:
States and localities are closer to the people and understand better
threats to their health. Because they are closer to the community,
they can adapt prevention strategies to meet the needs of localities.
States also are better placed to ‘experiment’ with solutions to
complex health problems. By permitting states to act as laboratories
for innovative health policies, the federalist system can, in theory,
sort out effective from less effective interventions.115

The conceptual appeal of this approach was also articulated in the Rowell-Sirois Report and, seventy years later, there is no reason to believe
that these observations no longer apply:
[T]here are pronounced regional differences in Canada in social
philosophy which are bound to affect public health legislation.
Centralization   of   jurisdiction   might   not,   therefore,   conduce  
to progressive action in public health or to national unity in
general.116

The holdings in Rio Hotel Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing
Board)117 and Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General)118 show a will115

Lawrence O. Gostin, “Public Health Theory and Practice in the Constitutional
Design” (2001) 11 Health Matrix 265 at 287.
116
Rowell-Sirois Report, supra note 21 at 34.
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ingness by the Supreme Court to uphold the role of local governments
in responding to regional “social philosophy,” even if the response appears to encroach upon the federal criminal law power. In Rio Hotel,
New Brunswick had enacted legislation regulating nude entertainment
in establishments licensed to serve alcohol. Rio challenged the law as an
attempt to legislate morality, thereby making it criminal law. To be sure,
the Criminal Code  includes  prohibitions  similar  subject  matter  as  was  
dealt with by the provincial legislation. In holding the law to be a valid
exercise of provincial power under ss. 92(13) and 92(16), the Court assigned   it   a   very   narrow   purpose,   ﬁnding   that   it   was   simply   aimed   at  
regulating the forms of entertainment which licensed establishments
could use in their marketing efforts.119 While the reasons do not directly
address the democratic importance of allowing provinces to legislate
under   s.   92(16)   in   a   way   which   reﬂects   the   values   of   the   local   community,  such  reasoning  can  be  inferred  from  the  majority’s  decision  to  
uphold the law under the non-controversial licensing power in s. 92(13)
when there was clearly a deeper thread of morality running through the
legislation.
Similarly, in Siemens, the Supreme Court upheld provincial legislation allowing for binding municipal plebiscites with respect to banning
Video Lottery Terminals (VLTs), despite the fact that gaming is also
a matter addressed under the Criminal Code.  Major  J.,  writing  for  the  
Court, held that:
[T]he purpose of the VLT Act as a whole seems to be, quite
simply, to allow municipalities to express, by binding plebiscite,
whether they wish VLTs to be permitted or prohibited within their
communities,120

and that such a purpose was intra vires the province, again under ss.
92(13) and 92(16). The Court held that there were many valid reasons
for which a municipality might wish to ban VLTs, and even if moral
considerations arise in these reasons, this will not invalidate the law and
render it criminal in nature.121
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CONCLUSION
As discussed above, infectious disease control is not concerned with morality. But the reasons in Rio Hotel and Siemens are nonetheless applicable here. In short, local needs, values and customs will often elude the
federal government, which does not have an effective means of identifying these local needs and responding to them. In contrast, the local and
provincial governments are likely to be seized of such mechanisms and
therefore must be accorded deference in their legislative decisions, even
if  they  appear  to  be  addressing  an  otherwise  federal  subject  matter.
Granted, sometimes these local needs, values and customs will
be  immaterial  to  the  exercise  of  proper  jurisdiction.  For  example,  the  
criminal law will apply without exception across Canada; one province
cannot amend certain provisions as applied to them because their local
culture  is  in  disagreement  with  the  federal  approach.  But  when  a  subject  
matter not only implicates provincial heads of power but plays heavily upon these local values, there is excellent reason to leave primary
jurisdiction  with  the  provinces,  despite  the  strength  of  arguments  under  
federal powers such as POGG or the criminal law.
In extreme cases, such as where one province fails to act altogether
in  respect  of  a  public  health  emergency,  federal  jurisdiction  may  be  required if only on a temporary basis. But with respect to regional differences in public health legislation, such differences should not be
dogmatically   impugned   and   subjected   to   standardization.   Differences  
in approach do not suggest that provinces have abdicated their responsibility or in any way compromised their ability to protect the health
of their citizenry. On the contrary, the very fact of these differences
suggests that provincial and municipal governments have acted based
on   the   needs   and   values   of   their   communities,   thereby   fulﬁlling   their  
responsibility to protect health and, at the same time, preserving local
democracy and the relationship between an individual and their local
community.  In  assessing  arguments  for  federal  jurisdiction  over  public  
health, the unique position and abilities of the other governments must
be kept at the forefront of the discussion. Such an approach will likely
conclude that in all but extreme circumstances, the provinces must not
be  divested  of  primary  jurisdiction  over  public  health.  

